The Kirloskar Oil Engines Lid., Kirkee, Poona v. The Workmen
Gajetdragadkar J.
November 20,
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP, enquiry under s. 36A. It is clear that in substance the argument is that the direction issued by the award in regard to the payment in question should be modified, and in support of the claim for modification reliance is placed on the relevant orders issued ]yy the State Government for changing the weekly holidays. Such a claim cannot obviously be entertained in clarification proceedings under
8. 364. A proceeding contemplated bys. 36A is not a proceeding intended to enable the tribunal to review or modify its own order; it is intended to enable the tribunal only to clarify the provisions of its award where a difficulty or doubt arises about the interpretation of the provisions. Quite clearly the impugned provisions contained in paragraph }4 of the award in relation to this demand are clear and unambiguous. Whatever may be the appellant's grievance in respect of the validity or the propriety of the said directions there is no difficulty or doubt about their meaning; and so we are satisfied that tho tribunal] was right in refusing to alter the said dircction in the present proceedings.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
——= ——
M/S. MOTIPUR ZAMINDARY CO. (P) LTD. vu THE STATE OF BIHAR
(BR. P. Sovma, C.7., TU. Karur, M. HrpayATULiat, J.C. Suan and J. R. Munnorkar, JJ.)
Sales Tax—Exempltion of qreen wegetables—Sugar Cane, if falls within exemplion—Dealer—Producer of sugar cane, whether a dealer—Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Bihar 19 of 1947), $3, 2(c), 6B-—Notification No. 9884—F 7 dated August 28, 1947— Bihar Annual Finance Act, 1950.
Under s. 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, the Government issued a notification exempting certain goods from the
{1)S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 499 payment of sales tax, including ‘“‘green vegetables other than potatoes, except when sold in sealed containers”. ‘he appellant who was a producer of sugar cane was assessed to saies tax. He contended that sugar cane was a green vegetable and was exempted from tax and that he was not a dealer as defined ins. 2 (c) of the Act and could not be assessed to sales tax.
Held, that sugar cane was not a green vegetable and was not exemipted under the notification. The word “vegetables” in taxing statutes was to be understood as in common parlance ie. denoting class of vegetables which were grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and were used for the table. The dictionaries defined sugar cane as a ‘“‘grass.””
Ramavtar RBudhoiprasad vy. Assistant Salee Tax Officer, Akola, A.T.R. 1961 S. C. 1325, followed.
The State of Bombay v. R. §. Phadtare, {1956] 7S. T. C. 495, disapproved.
Held, further, that the appellant was a dealer within the definition ins. 2c). Section 2(chwas amended by the Bihar Annual Finance Act, 1950. The amended was not a temporary amendment for only one year; the amended section was applicable to the present case. The amending Act did not require the assent of the President as the matter fell entirely within entry 54 of the State List.
Crvi, APPELLATE JurispreTion: Civil Appeals Nos. 185 to 187 of 1961.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment ani orler dated May 13, 1959, of the Patna High Court in Misc. Judicial Case No. 352 of 1957.
WITH Petitions Nos. 163 to 163 of 1959.
Petitions Under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, Veda Vyasa and Nauntt Lal, for the appellants/petitioners.
A. S. R. Chari, D. P. Singh., M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the respondents.
Mis, Motipur Zamnidary Co, (P} Ltd,
Vv: The State of Bihar
M/s. Meti dey Co (P) Ltd,
¥, The State of Bihar Kapur J.
Zz
1961. November 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Kapur, J.—The principal question raised in these appeals and petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution is whether sugar cane falls within the term “green vegetables” and is therefore exempt from sales tax under the exemption given by the notification dated August 28, 1947, issued under s. 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act 1947, (Bihar 19 of 1947), hereinafter called the ‘Act’. After hearing the arguments in these appeals and petitions we announced our decision dismissing them with costs and we now proceed to give our reasons for the same.
The three appeals by special leave are brought by the assessee and relate to assessment of sales tax for three years, 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53 for which the amount of sales tax levied was Rs. 28,866, Rs. 23,383 and Rs. 23,298 respectively. Besides the three appeals the assessee company has filed threo petitions under Art. 32 challenging the constitutionality of the assessments. In this judgment the appellant and the petitioner is a private limited company and it will be termed “appellant” and the State of Bihar which is respondent will be termed the “respondent”.
The appellant took an objection to the assessment and filed appeals to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial taxes and then a revision to the Board of Revenue and then at ita instance the following question was referred by the Board of Revenue to the High Court for opinion :—
‘Whether sugar cane is a green vegetable within the meaning of item 6 of notification No. 9884-FT dated 28-8-47 and assuch exempt from taxation.”
The High Court answered the question against the appellant and held that “sugar cane” was not
(1)S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 4501 included in the term “green vegetables” and it is the correctness of that answer which has been canvassed before us. In the petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution it was contended that the appellant being a producer of sugar cane was not a “dealer” within the meaning of the Act and therefore no tax was payable on sale of sugar cane by it.
The exemption under the Act is provided under s.6 of the Act which, at the relevant time, was as follows :—
S. 6 “No tax shall be payable under this Act on the sale of any goods or class of goods specified in this behalf by the (State) Government by notification in the Official Gazette, subject to such conditions as may be mentioned in the notification:
Provided no notification shall be issued under this section without giving in the Official Gazette such previous notice as the State Government may consider reasonable, of its intention to issue such notification.”
Under s. 6 of the Act the notification relied upon was issued on August 28,1947, This was notification No. 9884-FT which was in the following terms:—
“In exercise of the powers conferred by section 6 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (Bihar Act XIX of 1947), and in supersession of aj] the previous notifications on the subject the Governor of Bihar is pleased to direct that no tax shall be payable under the said Act on tho sale of goods specified in the second column of the schedule hereto annexed subject to the exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the third column thereof.
M ™ Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd.
v. The State of Bihar
—
Rapur J, ws, - Mie. Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Ltd. ;
. The State of Bihar Kapur J.
._: The Question raised is that sugar ‘cane falls within
THE SCHEDULE —— Serial Description Exception subject to which the No. of goods. ~ exemption has been allowed.
6 Green vegetables. Except when sold in’ sealed other than pota- containers. toes. | ; Sos
POPC Pm Reem Oe ete e renee Crete Eee A TORE OEE Ne Hu DD rR esboseeseneoeee ene the term “green vegetables” in entry 6. of. the Schedule’ and is therefore exempt from assessment to Sales tax. ‘ In support of this contention counsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment of the Bombay High Court, The State of Bombay v. R. 8. Phadtara({1) where it was held that sugar cane is “fresh vegetable”. and is therefore exempt from sales tax under a similar notification issued under the Bombay Sales ‘Tax Act. Chagla C. J., there observed at page 496 as follows:— 2 “In its plain and natural meaning ‘a “vegetable” clearly is wide enough to cover “sugar cane’;. but what_is urged by the Ad- ‘vocate General is that we must not give it that wide meaning but must give it the ' popular meaning as understood by. people ~ who.’ deal in vegetables or eat vegetables, and it is urged that ‘from that narrow and restricted point of view sugar cane is not vegetable. This is a taxing statute and if _ two constructions are ‘possible we must lean in favour ‘of that construction which gives relief to the subject... That was exactly the (1) {1956} 7 S.T.C, 495,
(1)S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS — 503 approch of the Sales Tax Tribunal and in our opinion that approch was a very proper one.”
This observation is not in accord with the opinion given by this Court in Ramaytar Badhriprasad v. Assistant Sales Tux Officer, Akola (') in which under an almost identical entry it was held that “betel leaves’ is not included in the term “vegetables”. After quoting with approval a passage from the judgment of the Nagpur High Court, Madhya Pradesh Pan Merchants Association v. State of Madhya Pradesh (*) this court said :
_ “the word “vegetable” in taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen garden or ina farm and are used for the table.”’
If that is the meaning of the word “vegetables” sugar cane cannot fail within entry 6 which relates to green vegetables. In Webster’s dictionary “sugar cane” has been defined as “a grasa extensively grown in tropical and warm rogions for its sugar” and in Oxford dictionary it is defined as “a tall peronnial grass cultivated in tropical and sub-tropical countries and forming the chief source of unmanufactured sugar”. Therefore it cannot be said that sugar cane falls within the definition of the words “green vegetable”.
The second question which was raised before us and which arises in the petitions under Art. 32 is that the appellant company is not a “dealer” within the meaning of the word as defined in s. 2(c) of the Act which is as follows :—
“dealer” means any person who sells or supplies any goods (including goods sold .or supplied in the execution of a contract)
({) A. I. R.[1961] S.C. 1325. (2) [1956] 7S. T. C. 99.
M/s. Motipur Zamindary Co. (P) Lid.
v, The State of Bikar
_——
Kapur J.
Alls, Mfotipur emindery Co. {i’) Lid. v, 7 he State of Bihar Vepur J.
whether for commission, remuneration § or otherwise and includes any firm or a Hindu joint family, tho Government and any society club or association which sells or supplies goods to its members’.
The words of this sub-section are very wide and cover the case of the appellant and therefore this point is also withuut substance and must be rejected. But it was argued that the definition of the word “dealer” in the Act which was amended by Bihar Annual Finance Act 1950 is applicable only for the financial year beginning April I, 1950, and not for subsequent years and for that aid was sought from the preamble to the Bihar Annua} Finance Act 1950. That preamble is as follows : —
“Whereas it is expedient to amend tho Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948, to levy a tax on passengers and goods carried by public service vehicles and public carriers and to lay down rates on Sales Tax payable under Bihar Sulcs Tax Act 1947 to fix limit of taxable agricultural incume to lay down rates of agricultural Income Tax Act and Super Tax chargeable under Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948 for the financial year beginning on the Ist day of Apri] 1950 and to make turther provisions in connection with the finance of this State of Bihar”.
The preamble cannot limit or change the meaning of the plain words of s. 2(c) of the Act which apply to the case of the appellant and therefore the amended section is applicable tu the present case. It is an erroneous approach to the question to say that because of the words “for the financial year beginning on the first of April 1950” in the particu. lar context in the preamble, the definition of the word ‘dealer’ was amended only for one year Nothing has becn shown indicating that section
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 505
(2)(i) of Bihar Annui Finance Act intended to effect a temporary amendment in the previous definition of the word “dealer” in cl(c) of s. 2 of the Act. The contention is therefore repelled.
It was also submitted that the assent of the President was not given to the Bihar Annual Finance Aot 1950. In our opinion that submission if equally without force because tax on sale of goods is a matter entirely within entry 54 of the State List and the amendment made in the definition of the word “dealer” in the Act did not require the assent of the President.
In our opinion the appeals and the petitions under Art. 32 are without merit and are therefore dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.
Appeals and writ petitions dismissed.
THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL, BIHAR AND ANOTHER v, N. BAKSHI
(B. P. Sinna, C. J., J. L. Kapur, M. Hipayatunuau, J. C. Suan and J. R. MupHonxakr, JJ.)
Indian Civil Service—Conditions of service—Passage benefits—Statutory righi—Constitutional guarantee—Cancellation of passage benefits under rule making power—Validity— ‘Remuneration’, meaning of—Superior Civil Services (Kevision of pay and pension) Rules, 1924-—Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 36 Geo. 5, Ch.42), 8. 247 (1) —Indian Independence Act, 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. 6, Ch. 30), ss. 10 (2), 19(4)— All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), ss. 3,4—All India Services (Overseas pay, passage and leave salary) Rules, 1957, r.3—Constitulion of India, Art. 314.
Under the Superior Civil Services (Revision of Pay and Pension) Rules, 1924, framed by the Secretary of State for India-in-Council under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1919, members of the Indian Civil Service and their wives and children were entitled to passage benefits which
A fs. Motipur Ramindary Co. (P) Lid.
v. The State of Bihar
Kapur J.
November 21.