A. 614 OO - , \ RAVI DUTT SHARMA _ “YN Bo. : * . RATAN LAL BHARGAVA | ‘
February 20, 1984",
C : [ S. MurTAzA. Fazau Aur, A. VARADARAJAN & RN. Misra, JJ. ] a . . . 7 * i ‘Constitution of India 1950, Article 14: Sections 144, 25A and 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 whether ultra vires Article 14.
. \ . D , slam Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act. 1956, s, 19 Delhi. Rent Control Act 1958, Ss.14 (1) (e), 144, 254, 25B & 25C: suit by landlord for eviction of tenant under s.14(1) (e) or s.14A of the Rent Act—prior permission of Competant °
" Authority under Slum Clearance Act—Whether necessary, x
By. ~The appellant—tenant was inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1949. The respondent landlord applied under section 19 (¥) (a) of the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956 before the Competent Authority for permitting him _ to institute a suit for eviction of the appellant but that application was dismissed,
” and the order was confirmed in appeal by the Financial Commissioner. ‘Thereafter the respondent field a'suit for eviction in April 1979 under section 14 (1) () read ~ ; with section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958. The tenant applied for leave . F +to defend the suit but the same was rejected ‘and an order of eviction was passed. A revision filed by the tenant /in the High Court was dismissed.
Ia the appeal to this Court as well asin the connected Special Leave Petition it, was.contended that: (1) under Seetion 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act it is incumbent _ on the landlord to obtain permission frem the Competent Authority before insti- . G tution of a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit was no maintainable, and (2) sections 25A and 25B were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was’ an cxisting statute and, -therefore, the prqcedure substituted under: Chapter: IIIA, particularly sections 254 and 25i should be invalidated. a &
Dismissing the Appeal and Special Leave Petition:
x \ ; sO \ , ~ eo . / 4 ; ° RAVI DUTT ¥. RATAN LAL _ - 7 61S. ! | HELD: AG) The High Court was, * coirect in rejecting the. applications ‘of | be” the > fenanis for setting aside the order: ete eviction. [6245] - .
‘B. a Sections [4A; 25A; 25B aad 25C of the Rent Actare special. provisions 50 . . faras the landlord and tenant are ‘concerned andi in view of. the non-obstante clause these provisions override the existing - law s sO far -as, the new procedure is concerned; ',
. - Heal a at tan.
; on 2) There is Ho. difference either on principle 0 or in law’ between sections 14 © (xe) and 14A of the Rent Act event though these twos provisions relate ‘to éviction . , an . Of tenants under different situations; [624B]
@)' The proceduire incdiporated in Chapter HIA Sof thé Amending Act into the Rent Act is in public interest and i is not viola tive of Article 14 ‘of the Constitu* - x. . » po
‘tion; [624C] we 7 4 4 ‘In view sof the procedure i in Chapter TA of the Rent Act, the Stum Act is roudered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency and it is’ not, therefore, neces ° ; sary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Compctent Authority, under s, 19° yo s (1)(@). of the Slum’ Act. before instituting a suit for eviction and coming. within s. 14 . Me or 14A of the Rent. Act. [624D-E} :
Yo ae ‘
«O - ca) The dominant object. of the Amending’ ‘Act of 1976 was to provide a a
—? . speedy, expeditious - and effect remedy fora: class of landlords contemplated by secrm, Sections 14(1){e) and 14A and for avoiding*unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent-Act. Suits for eviction cunder the Act take a long time commencing woe! ‘with the Rent @ontroller and ending up with’ the Supreme Court. In many cases . . oy: the ‘time the eviction decree became final several ‘years elapsed and either ‘the | a __ landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared. Tt ¥ . ‘was this mischief which the. legislature intended to avoid by incorporating the new . . Procedure in Chapter IIA: It cannot therefore be said that the classification of ' such landlords would be an ureasonable one because sucha classification has got it seeks to: _subserve. [19D-Fs Si , cre » (2). The new sections 1 4A, 25A, 25B and 5c had been introduced for the: ne a purpose of meeting 2. Pasticular contingency as spelt out in the object and reasons ye ' behind the new provisions. Once it is recognised that the newly added sections are _in the nature of a special law intended to apply to special classes of landlords, the
. inevitable conclusion would be that the application of the Slum Act stends with,
‘drawn to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of sections 14(1)(e) and
144: ‘would not be governed“ or controlled by section 19 o fa) of the Slum Act. :.
re . © (621CD-]_ a clear ‘nexus with*the objects of the Amending Act of 1976 and the purposes which, - ~-
616 \,. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2's.cr.
_ GQ)‘ Tt is opento the fesislature to pick out ‘onc class of the iandlords out of several covered by sectiog ‘14(1)(2) of the Rent Act so long as they formed a class by-‘themselves and the legislature was free to provide the benefit of the special proce- dure to them in the matter of eviction of their tenants as long as the legislation had‘ an object to achieve and the special procedure had a reasonable nexus with suck .
object to be secured, [621F-G] . . = ‘ toe yO . (4) The new provision in the Amending Act were intended to have overtis ding effect and all procedural. laws were to give way tothe new proceduré. [623D] \ . . . °
* t
’ Kewal Singh v, Lajwanti [1980] 1 S, CR. 854; Sarwan Singh & Anr. ¥,, Kasturi
” Lal [1977] 2 S.C.R. 421; Vinod Kumar (Chowdiry v. Narain Devi Taneja {1980} 2 ’
S.C.R. 746 referred to.
"ow
Smt: Kr ishna Devs Nigam & Ors. v. Shyam Babu Gupta & Ors. AIR 1780 Delhi 165 approved.
Es
Civit APPELLATE JuRIspIcTION : Civil Appeal No.-212 of 1981 ;
. é : ' ‘
- Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 26th. August, 1980 of the Dethi -High Court in CR. No. 790 .
of 1979: . ; a nn _' WITH
' SPECIAL. LBAVB PETITION (CIVIL) NQ. 2948 OF 1982 oo From the judgment and. order dated the 17th December, 1981 “of the Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 873 of 1981. * VM. Terkunde, P/M. Parekh, Ms. Indu Mathotra, d Ms. Kailash Mehta & Viral Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners.
,
Bikarnyjt Nayer and D. D. ‘Sharma for the c Respondent in CA, 212/81.
~
RAVI DUTT ¥. RATAN LAE (Fazal Ali, J. ) vg 617 mI wo
7. S. Kawatra & NK. sara the Respondent in S.LP. A
~ No. 2948 “of 1982. , u a "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by: | #Fazar Aut, J. This Appeabby, special’ leave is directed against » ‘an order’ passed by the* Delhi High Court om August 26, 1980. *.. - . _ affirming an order of eviction of.the appelant made by the ‘Rent eontroller, The facts of the case’ lie wthin.a- ‘very’ narrow compass: “
Wind the appeal involves a pure, point of taw which is already convered Cc . " by decisions of ts court tow which’ we shall presently refer. ’
+ 7
-_ -. The tenant, Ravi Dutt. Sharma; was inductéd into the suit premises as for back as 1945. The: landlord Ratan Lal Bhatgava applied =~ under’ section 19 (1) (a} of the Slum Clearance Act (‘Slufn Act’ for” D- Short) before the Competent Authority for permitting chim to institute.a suit for eviction of the - appellant but that’ application was- . . ‘dismissed on July 28, 1973. An appeal against this’ order was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner on October 4,, 1974. Thereafter - 4, Respondent filed a suit for eviction of the tenant under’ s: 14 age. ' sread with s. 25 (B) of the Delhi Rent Control Act ‘(Rent Act’ for —E t ,short), on April 13, 1979. Under the provisions of the Rent Act as” _~Gamended ‘in 1976 it is* ‘incumbent upon the defendant tenant to apply . ‘fot leave’ to defend a suit for eviction before-entering contest; The ” | tenant: applied for’ such leave but the same was rejected and an order. i -_ of his eviction was passed-on September. 14, 1979: A revision by thé tenant to the High Court was dismissed and that has ‘led to the appeal.” F to this Court. - _ * va
_o
Tn ‘the special. leave petition Smt. Puspa Rani filed’ a suit for
. ‘was allowed by the Rent Controller and a revision therefrom has been’ dismissed by the High Court. Hence the ‘petition: for special leave |. against judgnient of the High Court has. been filed and that was directed | _ to be heard along with the Civil Appeal. It is unnecessary to give the facts ‘involved in the case in which special leave ‘has been asked — H ; for because the point ‘of law for cosideration is one and the s: same. :
. é oa 3 nn - }
. eviction against her’ tenant, Swaran Kumar and others, which also’ “G
*
G18 supreme court REporTS ! [1984] 2 s.c.
Admittedly the houses for which eviction | has been asked for.in these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenants that the suits
. for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of
"permission from the competent Authority under the Slum Act. Under section 19 (1) (a) of the Slum Act ‘if*is incumberit’on the landlord to
_ obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a
Suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit is. x a maintainable. °
This argument was countered by the respondent on the etound N
_ that by virtue of the Amending Act of 1976 (referred to as the
‘Amending Act’ for short) a ‘new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenant—one of which was covered by .s. .14 (J) (e) and the other by .séction 14 (A). In the instant case we ate mainly egncermed, with eviction. applications | covered by s.° 14(1) fe), and” the’ special procdure provided in Chapter III-A introduced by the Admending Act. It was contended by the respandent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special’protection was gtven to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisions of s. 14 (1) (€) of the Rent Act (personal necessity) and in such
"cases a procedure different from the procedure followed in other cases had been prescribed. Section 25 (A) and 25 (B) sought to simplify the procedure by insisting on the tenant to obtain permission to enter defence. In other words, so far as suits: for eviction on the ground of personal necessity weae concerned, the case for eviction _ =” "was put at par with suits under Order 37, Code of Civil Procedure | where the Court was. satisfied that the tenant had~an arguable case, -
‘leave to defend would be granted; otherwise the order of eviction ~ would be passed straightway.
a wf
. Learned counsel for the tenants then argued that sections 25(A) and 25 (B) were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing « statute te and, therefore, the procedure substituted under Chapter IlI—A, pafticulary in §S. 25(A)and 25 (B) should be invalideted. On, the
~ other hand, counsel for the landlords contended that by virtue of the
Amending Act a new procedure has been added in respect of evictions | under s. 14(1) (e) asalso the newly added 14(A), and sections 25(A) and 25(B) have been brought into the Statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature by providing a Special procedure and
\ eer ‘
”
“ a nN
.RAVI DUTT y, RATAN LAL t (Fazal Ali #) . 4 619.
“also making | provision Prat. the, new ’ | procedure. would override ‘the existing law to the contt ary.” , .
*, - aX t
Tn order to appreciate this contention. it: “may be necessary to give. van extract of Statement, of objects , and reasons of the Amending e Act 7 .
’ '
“y . . * : | ‘ \
“«There has been a persistent demand for. amendments: to the
Ng _ . Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view.: fo conferringy a’
‘right of tenanéy on certain heirs/successors of a. deceased . statutory, tenant to that they may be protected frorn eviction’ -. » by | landlords and also for simplifying. the: procedure for * eviction of ténants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal! occupation. Further Government .. “decided on the 9th September 1975. that, a _pérson who owns his own house i in his place of work should vacate;the Govern- ment dccommodatiom allotted to’ him before the 31st ‘Decem-- _ber: 1975. Goverame nt-éonsidered that in the circum- 7 stances, the Act requires to be amended urgently, ae aT
The dominant object of the Amending Act was, therefore, to provide a sp22dy, expaditio, us and effective remedy for a class of landlords
~ contemplated by ss. 14 (1)(e) and 14 (A) and for avoiding unusual j dilatory . process provided otherwise by the Rent Act..Jt is common — ~ experience that suits for eviction under: the Act take'a lorig.time.
commencing with thie Rent Controller and enditig up with the Sup-
; reme Court. In many: ‘cases experience: -has indicated that by the time .
the eviction.tecree became final several years elapsed and either, the. Jandlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of = action dissappered and if, there was further delay in securing eviction | and the: family of the landlord’ hal by then ‘expanded, in’ the abse- .
“<nee of accommodation the menibers of the family were virtually.
thrown oa the road. it. was this mischief wihch the legislature intended
-. to avoid by incorporating | the new procedute i in Chapter’ IIE “A. The legislature in its wisdom thought that -in cases ‘where the landlords . required théir own premisés - for bona. fide and personal “necessity they should’ be treated as a. Separate class along with the landlords ~ covered-by s..14.A ‘and should be allowed to reap ‘the fruits of - . decrees for’ eviction within’ the. quickest possible time. It cannot, | therefore, be said that the classification of such landlords would be oa tad ,.
620: . SUPREME COURT REPORTS - [1984] 2 s.c.x.
" nexus with the objects of the Amending ‘Act and, the: purposes which wa (1) [1980] 1 S.C.R. 854. ot ‘
‘it seeks to subserve. Tenants cannot complain of any discrimination because the’ Rent Act merely gave . certain protection to them in public interest and if ihe protection ‘or part of it: afforded by the
Rent Act was withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant: ‘under the Transfer of property Act was still_preserved; no genuine grievance could be made. This wa’ clearly held in the case of
,
_ Kewal Singh y. Lajwanti.) sO - | ¥
The matter is no ‘longer res, integra ‘and: is covered by two’ decisions of this Court which ate directly in ‘point. ane first one is the case of Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal, ) in which,an . identical point came up for- consideration, It-was held by this Court - an unreasonable one because such a classification has got a clear ly that sections 25.(A), 25 (B) and 25.(C) of the Rent Act (introduced a by the Amending Act) were special provisions with reference to s, 14 (A) thereof which superseded all existing Acts’to the contrary. It was also pointed out ‘that these newly added sections in ‘the Rent
- Act weré to apply only to, a class of landlords and, therefore, the question of violation of Act. 14 of the constitution did not arise, While considering verious aspects of the aforesaid + ‘provisions, Chand-
_rachud, J. (as. Re then was), spoks for. the Court thus Po i ~
~
. ‘When'two or more laws operate. in the same field ‘and _v
€ach contains a non-obstante clause stating that its provisions ' will override those of any other law, stimulating and inoisive problems’ of interpretation ‘arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional ‘protocol, cases of such ‘conflict » have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose ' of the laws under consideration...... For resolving such inter sé. conflicts, one other test may also be- applied though the * persuasive force-of such a test is but one of the factors which “combine to give a fair, meaning to the language of the law. That test is that the Jater erfanctment must prevail oyer the earlier one. Section 14 Aand Chapter UII A haying been ena- : cted with effect from December 1, 1975, are later enactments . in reference to s. 19 ofthe Slum ‘Clearance Act which in its present form, was placed. on the statute book with effect:
“7 ,
(2)[1977] 2 SCR. 421, an 7 Do.
A Py oNe . : o :
~"
"4 an a)
on ' ot _. from ‘February. 28, 1965 and | in “reference to s. 39 of the same. . Act, which came’ into force in 1956 when the Act itself was . -passed, The legislature gave - over-riding effect tos. 14A and ’ Chapter I A with the ‘knowledge that ss.’ 19 and 39 of the Slum Clearance Act. contained hon- -obstante clauses. of equal efficacy. Therefore, ithe later enactment must prevail. over -the - fornier. .., Bearing in mind the languagé of the two laws, their _ object and purpose, and the: fact that ° ‘one of: thém is later i in. . point.of time and was enactéd with the knowledge of the non-obstante ‘clauses in, the earlier law,. we have come:to the - ‘conclusion that the provisions of s. 14 A dnd Chapter. HI. A of the Rent’ Control Act. must prevail over those contained .
. on 8s, 19 and 39 ‘of ‘the. Slum Clearance. Act... Be
~.
,.
"An analysis of the aforesaid decision élearl ly reveals that’ the-new " sections 14A) 25(A); 25(B) and 25(C). had been introdced for the purpose of meeting a particular contingency aespelt out\in the objects and | reasons behind the new provisions. Once it is, recoginsed that the
- newly added sections are.in the nature of a special law. intended to’
, apply to “ special classes’ of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would be that the application of thé Sulm Act. stands | withdrawn to that’
extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid sections- -
14 (1): (e) and 144 sould not be: ‘governed or controlled by s. 19 O)
@e of the Slur’ Act.”
tt was; however, ‘submitted “that s. 144 of the’ Rent act dealt with a specail contingency, for which a ° different. procedure had been provided i in the, matter of evicting tenants. by the landiords in occu- pation of premises allotted by the Central. Government or any local authority. This ‘was to enable them to get their dwn residential’ ; accommodation so that théy would be in a. position to vacate’-the |. _ premises. alloted to them by the Central,Government.. It was conten- * . ded that as the: .Central Government and persons. in occupation as |
. tenants of premises provided. by Central Government were a class by " themselves, section 14 A could be taken as a. special provision but 14 (1) (e) of the Act could not. be elevated to that pedestal. We are
' not able to accept this ‘argument. .. It was open to the legislature to
. pick out one class of landlords out ‘of the ‘several covered by s..14> “ (1) (©) of the Rent act so long as they formed’ a class by themselues- and legislature was free to provide the -benefit of a special procedure to them i in the matter of eviction of their tenants ds long, the legisla
_ RAVI DUTT, ’. RATAN vat" (Fazal Ali, J) - : 621.
Paya
G-
B.S
. pon!
rant .
622 - : _ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~ . [1984] 2 s.ar.
> tion had ant object to achieve and the “specail procedure had a reas-onable naxus with such object to to be secured.
Despite-the ingenius and attractive arguments of Mr. Tarkunde, it seems to us that the distinction made by the Jearned counsel bet- , ween ss. 14(i)(€) and 14 A is really a distinction without any difference. Moreover, the newly added sections, viz., ss. 14A, 25(A), * 25 (B) and 25 (C) do constitute parts of a special scheme and have the effect of making the Sulm Act inapplicable. In view ‘of the ptonduncement of this Court as referred to above, it is impossible :
to accede to the contention advanced on behalf ‘of the tenants. In Kewal Singh’s case (supra), @ decision to. which one of us was a par asty (Fazal Ali, J.), this Court observed as follows —
+ . ; . ~ \ “The Act actually replaced the Ordinance which was promulgated on Ist December, 1979. The objects and reasons clearly reveal that the amendment has been made or simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requirés the premises bona fide for his personal occupation, Itus a ‘ matter of common knowledge that even though the lamdlord may have an immediate and imperative necessity for vacating the house giver to a tenant he ‘is compelled'io resort to the time consuming and dilatory procedure ofa suit..which takes —
- years before the landlord is able to obtain the ‘decree and in » most cases by the time the decree is passed either the landlord
- dies or the need disappears and the landlord is completely - deprived of getting any relief, It appears to us that it was for these reasons that the legislature in ‘its wisdom thought thdt a short and simple procedure should be provided for those land- ‘lords who generally want the ‘premises for their bona fide necessity so that they may be.able to get quick and expeditious relief. ...,.The landlords having personal necessity haye been brought together asa separate class because of their special needs and such a classification cannot be said to be unreaso- . nable particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that "7". the landlords should get this relief as quickly as possible
<
‘Thus taking an overall picture of the situation, the circum- stances under which the ,landlord’s needs have been calssified and the safeguards given by the statute it cannot be said by “ : :
observed;
RAVI-DUTT ?. RATAN LaL (Fazal Ali, J.) Oh 628 - any stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub-sectie A _ons are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. of Kidia, | or that section 29 B suffers fi rom, the vice of. excessive delega- tion of powers. In fact section 29 B contains valuable and sufficient guidelines’ ‘which completely exclude the éxercise of uncanalised or arbitrary powers by the Rent Controller.
a ae _ OB
The. ratio ‘oft ‘this case reinforces the rule laid down i in. Sarwan
Singh’s ‘case Supra and in Vinod - Kumar Chowdhry v. ‘Narain Devi"
Taneja, a it was clearly pointed out that whenever there was ‘any conflict between. section 29A and any. other provision of law, $29 0 ‘A was to override and prevail. Here again one of us (Fazal Ali, 5). C -
# ?
“The non-obstante clause occurring in séction’29-A makes it, quite clear that whenever there is a conflict between the provi-*:
- .. ‘sions of Chapter TIT A on’ the one hand and those of the rest of the Act or of any other law for the time being in fofee ons D the other, the former shall prevail. 2 vee a os
It is, therefore, clear from, the’ new provision in the Amending
Act thatthe procedure indicated therein was intended to. have over-
Tiding, effect and all. procedural laws were to give way ‘to the new E .
_ Procedure. Applications “under, s.,14 (1) (e), therefore, clearly fell ' within the protective umberlla of the new proceduré in 1 Chapter TTA.
; An identical view has been . taken by the Delhi High Court = * tn the case of Swit. Krishna” Devi’ Nigam ‘& Ors. v. Shyam Babu F
Gupta & Ors., s) In this, decision it has been clearly héld that-the pto- visions of s. 29A cannot be controlled by the provisions of the Slum Act. We fully ‘approve and endorse the ratio laid down in that
- decision as it is in conformity with ‘the: consistent ‘opinion of this
“. Court. »
Ona consideration, therefore, of the ‘acts and: circumstances of tho case and the law referred to’ above, we reach ‘the following
~ conclusions : . . oe Some,
“@ [1980] 2 SCR, 741. gy oo: a: Oo
-
(2)' AIR. 1980 Deibi 16s. a Se Te
624 ‘ ("SUPREME COURT REPORTS | [1984] 2 .s.cr.
A. ay That sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions so fatas the Jandlord and tenant " are concerned and in view of the non-obstante clause thesé provisions ‘would override. the existing law te) far ~ -as the new’ procedure is concerned;,.
_ (2)' That there is no difference either on principle or in law. . , between séctions, 14(1) (e)and J 14A of the Rent Act even’
. though these two provisions relate to tenants under diffe- x rent situations; ‘
3) That the procedure incorporated .in Chapter INA of the Amending Act into the. Rent Act is in’ public interest and ‘is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution;
., - 2. a, - (4) That in'view of the ‘procedure in Chapter IITA of the
" Rent Act, the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the yy : extent of inconsistency aid it is not, therefore, necessary
.for the landlord to obtain permission of the Competent: Authority under 8. 19 (1) @)-of the Slum Act before insti- .
E . tuting a suit for ‘eviction and coming within s. 19(1) (ce) or 19A of the “Rent Act. .
_
.
We are, therefore, of the- opinion ‘that the High ‘Court was
"+ correct in rejecting applications of the tenants for setting es‘de, the.
_order ofteviction. The appeal is accordingly dismsséd but without any, order as to costs. ~
. 7 ~ . , + - \ . x . : As.a result of oar décision, the special leave petition has’ to be dismissed. In both these cases time to Yacate the premises is; exten- ded till Fune 30, 1984, subject to filing of the usual undertaking within four weeks: from today failing which the landlords shall be free to "ask for possession forthwith through the executing court.’
"NVK So, Appeal & Petition dismissed.
s S)