POTTE LAKSHMI PERUMALLU Y. POTTI KRISHNAVENAMMA August 13, 1964
(K. SuBBA Rao, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND J. R. ; MUDHOLKAR JJ.)
Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937)— Husband member of joint family—Will by husband—Whether amounts to separation—Whether could be construed as family arrangemeni—Widow's interest—Determination—Whether as on the date of seeking partition or as on the date of death of husband.
The respondent, widow of S, the brother of the appellant, filed a suit claiming half share in the entire property by virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act. After the death of S, his only son by his first wife died at the age of 11 years. The respondent admitted that S had purported to execute a will before his death but contended that it was inoperative because he was a member of a Hindu joint family at the time of his death. The courts below found that the suit propertics were the joint family properties of S and the appellant, that the will executed by S was inoperative and not biodi ou the respondent and that she was entitled to half share in the suit properties. On appeal by special leave, the appellant contended that (1) the will executed by § itself resulted in a severance in the status of the two brothers constituting the joint family and that in any event separation ensued between them at the death of S; (2) at any rate the will should be construed to be a family arrangement made by the Karta of the family and assented to by the respondent and by the father and the foster-father of the respondent on her behalf. and (3) assuming that neither of the two contentions were correct, the interest to whioh the respondent would be entitled would be 3th share in the property and nm half share therein, this interest having to be ascertained as on the date of the death of S.
HELD : that the High Court rightly negatived ail these contentions.
(i) Nowhere in the will had S stated that be wanted to pat an and to the coparcenary. Indeed, the very assertion therein—though it has been concurrently found to be untrue—that the property was not jomt family property would preclude an inference that S intended to express an intention to separate and put an end to a coparcenary which, according to that assertion, in fact did not exist, [30G-31A]
A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchainma, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 933 referred to.
Gi) A family errangement which is for the benefit of the family generally can be enforced in a court of law. But before the court would do so, it must be shown that there was an occasion for entering iato.a family arrangement and it was acted upon, [31A-B]
(iii) According to the theory underlying the Hindu law the widow of a deceased Hindu is his surviving half and therefore as long as she is alive he must be deemed to continue to exist in her person. This surviving half bad, under the Hindu law texts, no right to claim a partition of the property of the family to which her husband belonged. Bat _the Act. of. 1937 has conferred that right upon her. When the Act says that she will have the same right as her husband had, it clearly meant that she would be entitled to be allotted the same share as her hushand
LAKSHMI vy, KRISHNAVENAMMA (Mudholkar J.) 27
‘would have been entitled to had he lived on the date on which she claimed partition. The interest devolving upon the widow need not necessarily be either by survivorship or by inheritance but could also be in a third way i.e., by statute and where the interest is taken by her under a statute it would be of a kind provided by the statute itself. [34B-D; 3783}
Case law discussed. Jadaobai v. Puranmal, L.L.R. [1944] Nag. 832, and Natarajan Chettiar _v. Perumal Ammal, A.LR. 1943 Mad. 246, disapproved.
Siveshwar Prasad vy, Lala Har Narain, 1.L.R. (1944) 23 Pat. 760 and Rejendrabati v. Mungalal, L.L.R. (1952) 31 Pat. 477, distinguished.
Civ, APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 519 of 1961,
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 11, 1958, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 1142/1953,
S. T. Desai and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellant.
G. Venkatarama Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mudholkar J. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of the High Court-of Andhra Pradesh affirming the decrees for partition and separate possession of certain movable and immovable properties, passed by the second Additional Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada.
The genealogical table showing the relationship between the parties set out below will be of assistance in appreciating the facts of the case : oo.
Potti Subba Rao (died in 1919)
| ieee First wife — Sitaralnaiah -~ Second wife Lakshmi Perumatlu Krishnamurti
‘died on laintiff) (defendant) (died in 1930) 0.8.1938) - Krishnavenamma
Pulla Pao died in 1939
Potti Subba Rao who died in the year 1919 was survived by three sons Sitaramaiah, Lakshmi Perumallu and Krishnamurti. Sitaramaiah was married twice. From the first wife he had a son ‘named Pulla’ Rao. After the death of the first wife he married Krishnavenamma, the plaintiff in the suit. Sitaramaiah died on ~ August 10, 1938. No issue was born to Krishnavenamma who was only 14 years of age at the time of Sitaramaiah’s death. Pulla
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965] | S.C.R.
Rao died in the year 1939 at the age of 11 years. Krishnamurti died in the year 1930 é.e., before Sitaramaiah, without leaving any issue or a widow. The plaintiff continued to stay in the same house as the defendant till the beginning of July, 1950. Then she suddenly left the house and instituted the suit in question on the 6th of that month. According to her Sitaramaiah and his two brothers, the defendant and Krishnamurti, acquired large movable and immovable property at Vijayawada, described in the schedule to the plaint, with the aid of their ancestral business. She claimed half share in the entire property set out in the schedules, by virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937. She admitted that her husband had purported to execute a will before his death but contended that it was inoperative because he was a member of a Hindu joint family at the time of his death. *
The defendant contested the claim on various grounds. According to him there was no ancestral property and the suit properties were acquired by the brothers by their individual efforts and treated as self-acquisition. Further according to him the will executed by Sitaramaiah is valid and binding on the plaintiff and that the property allotted to the plaintiff under the will was being enjoyed by the plaintiff and further the properties allotted to Pulla Rao devolved upon him after Pulla Rao’s death. Lastly, according to him even if the property were held to be joint family property of Sitaramaiah and the defendant the plaintiff would be entitled only to 1/4th share in them and not half share.
The courts below have found that the suit properties were the joint family properties of Sitaramaiah and the defendant, that the will executed by Sitaramaiah was inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff and that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the suit properties. The trial court gave direction to the effect that a commissioner be appointed for ascertaining the property liable to be partitioned and for dividing them into two equal shares by metes and bounds for the purpose of awarding to the plaintiff the separate possession of her half share in the properties.
Mr. S. T. Desai who appears for the defendant-appellant has not challenged the concurrent findings of the courts below to the effect that the propcrties acquired bv the family were joint family properties. He, however, urged the following three contentions before us :
(1) The will executed by Sitaramaiah on August 3, 1938 itself resulted in severance in the status of the two brothers constituting the joint family and that in any
LAKSHMI v. KRISHNAVENAMMA (Mudholkar J.) 28 event separation ensued between them at the death of ; Sitaramaiah; ,
(2) that at any rate the will should be construed to be a family arrangement made by the karta of the family and assented to by the defendant.and by the father and the foster-father of the plaintiff on her behalf;
(3) assuming that neither of the two contentions is correct, the interest to. which the plaintiff would be entitled would be 1/4th share in the property and not half share therein. This interest has to be ascertained as on the date of the death of Sitaramaiah. ,
+2 All these conténtions were also urged before the High Court but were negatived by it and in our opinion, rightly. Mr. Desai has, however, placed reliance upon a recent decision of this Court in A. Raghavamma & anr.v. A. Chenchamma & anr.(*) in support
‘of the contention that the will itself effected a severance in status.
What was held in that case was that a member of a joint Hindu family can bring about a separation in status by a definite and unequivocal declaration of his intention to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty by expressing such am intention even in a will. It was further held that the knowledge: of the expression of intention to separate has to be brought home to the persons affected by it and if that is done it relates back to the date when the intention was formed and expressed. A perusal of the will, Ex. B-1, does not however unmistakably show that the intention of Sitaramaiah was to separate himself from the joint family. At the outset he has stated : “I have executed this will regarding the arrangements to take effect after my life-time with regard to the enjoyment of the joint immovable and movable properties which are possessed by me and under my management by: my brother and others.” In the second paragraph he has stated’ that he had no ancestral property at all and that the business carried on by himself and his brother was established by them. In the third’: paragraph hé directed that the plaintiff shall maintain his son Pulla
Rao and that his brother would look after the interests of Pulla Rao.
The 4th, 5th and the 8th paragraphs on which reliance is placed’
by Mr. Desai run thus : ;
“4. If for any reason the said Krishnaveni does not agree: to be like that my younger brother Lakshmi Perumallur shall deliver possession of the upstair house constructed newly on the house site purchased from Nadakurthi
"(i) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 933,
LiSup./64-— 3
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965} 1s:
Kristamma and others and the tiled room situate in the big street and purchased from Gunda Subbarayudu out of the immovable property possessed by-me in Bezwada town on condition of including them in the half share of the property that shall pass to my‘son after my life-time.
5. The said Krishnaveni shall be at liberty to take possession of the two properties mentioned in paragraph 4 above, to pay all kinds of taxes payable thereon and to enjoy freely throughout her life-time only the income got every year from the said two properties without powers of gift, mortgage, exchange and sale. by following the age-old custom and by maintaining the family respect and custom and the said two properties shall pass to my son Pulla Rao alias Venkatasatyanarayana after her life-time.
8. My younger brother Lakshmi Perumallu shall keep the remaining entire property joint till my son Pulla Rao alias Venkatasatyanarayana attains majority and manage the same, shall bring up the boy properly, celebrate the marriage and other auspicious functions and divide the half share of the property after he attains majority and deliver possession of the same to my son.”
It seems to us difficult to infer from the recitals in these paragraphs that Sitaramaiah had expressed his unequivocal intention to get separated in status. No doubt, in the 4th paragraph he has observed that in certain circumstances certain property will be included in the half share of the property that would pass to his son after his death and he has also said in paragraph 5 that the plaintiff shal! be at liberty to take possession of the two properties indicated in paragraph 4, enjoy them during her life time and that on her death they will pass to Pulla Rao. But in paragraph 6 he has referred to the remaining property as “joint property” and has repeated that in paragraph 7. Again, what he has said in paragraph 8 militates wholly against the inference of separation in status. There he has enjoined upon the defendant to keep the remaining property joint till Pulla Rao attained majority, manage the same and divide that property between himself and Pulla Rao after the latter attained majority. Nowhere in the will has he stated that he wanted to put an end to the coparcenary. Indeed, the very assertion which has been concurrently found to be untrue that the property was not: joint famity property would preclude an inference that Sitaramaiah intended to express his intention to separate in status and put an end to a coparcenary which, according to that assertion, in fact did
LAKSHMI y, KRISHNAVENAMMA (Mudholkar J.) 31 not exist, In the circumstances we cannot accept the first contention of Mr. Desai.
No doubt, a family arrangement which is for the benefit of the: family generally ean be enforced in a court of law. But before the court would do so, it must be shown that there was an occasion for effecting a family arrangement and that it was acted upon. It is quite clear that there is complete absence of evidence to show that there was such an occasion or the arrangement indicated in the will was acted upon. The letter Ex. B12 upon which reliance was placed before the High Court on behalf of the defendant has not ‘heen found by it to be genuine. The defendant had also pleaded that the provisions under the will were given effect to but no satisfactory evidence has ‘been adduced to prove that the plaintiff was in enjoyment of the properties allotted to her under the will. We cannot, therefore, accept the second contention of Mr. Desai.
Coming to the last question there is a certain amount of conflict in the decisions of the various High Courts. One view is that the quantum of interest to which a Hindu widow is entitled under s. 3(2) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, is to be determined as on the date on which she seeks to enforce partition under sub-s. (3) of s. 3. The other view is that it has to be determined as on the date on which her husband died, that is to say, that it is not a fluctuating interest increasing or decreasing as a result of deaths or births in the family.
The first mentioned view has been stated with approval in Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, (12 ed.) and it is stated at pp. 109-110:
“The share which devolves on a widow of a deceased coparcener is not a fixed and determinate share but what she takes is the ‘same interest as he himself had’. Therefore, until there is partition, she cannot predicate the particular fraction of her share for it is likely to increase or decrease by birth or death of other coparceners. Her share would include a share in accretions to the joint family property till partition is effected. Prior to the . Act, a widow was entitled to a share in partition among her sons in her capacity as a mother (except in Madras). It has been held in a number of cases that after the Act the widow cannot claim a double share on partition between the sons, one in her capacity as a widow and another as a mother. Under the prior law, stridhan acquired by a female from her hushand or father-in-law was taken
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965] 1 S.C.R.
into account when a share was allotted to her on partition amongst the sons. The share she gets under section 3(2) is not affected by any rule of Hindu law to the contrary and it has been held in a Nagpur case that such stridhan received by her would not be deducted from her share on partition.”
In support of this statement in law reliance has been placed upon the following decisions :
Nagoppa v. Mukambe(1); Mahadu v. Gajarabai(*); Shivappa v. Yellewa(*?); Gangadhar v. Subhashsini(*); Tukarain v. Gangi(*); Ramchandra v. Ramgopal(*); Hanuman y. Tulsabai(").
In addition to these decisions our attention was also invited to Gurudayal v. Sarju(*); Kamal Kishore v. Harihar(*); Sabujperi v. Satrughan Isser(?°); Movva Subba Rao v. Movva Krishna Prasadam(''); Parappa v. Nagamma('?); Manicka v. Arunachala(?*); Harekrishna v. Jujesthi(*); Keluni v. Jagabandhu("*); The Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Litd., v. K.> Kotayya('*); Laxman v. Gangabai(!"); Bhondu v. Ramdayal(?*); Ratan Kumari v. Sunder Lal(**).
The High Court itself referred to the decision in Chinniah Chettiar v. Sivagami Achi(*°) which is a decision of the Full Bench constituted for resolving an apparent conflict between the decisions in Chinniah Chettiar’s case(“*) and Subba Naicker v. Nallammal(?!), In the opinion of the Full Bench there was really no conflict between the two decisions and that the right conferred by the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act was a new right in modification of the pre-existing one. The Full Bench further held that s. 3(2) of the Act does not bring about a severance of interest of the deceased coparcener, that his widow is not raised to the status of a coparcener though she continues to be a member of the joint Hindu family as she was before the Act, that the joint family would continue to exist as before subject only to her statutory rights and that the rights of the other members of the family would be worked out on the basis that the husband died
(1) LLR. T9St] Bom. 442. (2) LL.R. [1954] Bom. 885.
(3) LL.R. [1953] Bom. 958. (4) ALR. 1955 Orissa 135.
(5) A.LR. 1957 Nag. 28. (6) LL.R. [1956] Nag. 362.
(7) A.LR. 1956 Nag. 63. (8) A.ILR. 1952 Nag. 43
(9) LL.R. [1951] Pat. 357. (10) A.L.R. 1958 Pat. 405.
dd) ULR. aa Mad. 257. (12) LL.R. (1954) Mad. 183 (F.B.). (13) LR. [1961] Mad. 1016. (14) LL.R. (1955] Cutt. 709.
(1S) I.L.R. {1957} Cutt. 630. (16) A.LR. 1955 Andh. 135.
(17) iLR. [1955] M.B. 282. (18) A.1.R. 1960 M.P, 51.
(19) ATR, 1959 Cal. 787. I.L.R. (1945] Mad. 402.
(20) (21) (1949) 2 M.L.J. 536.
LAKSHMI v, KRISHNAVENAMMA (Mudholkar J.) "33 on the date when the widow passed away, the right to survivorship being suspended till then. Further according to the Full Bench a widow can under the Act claim a share not-only in the property owned and possessed by the family at the time of his death but also in the accretions arising therefrom, irrespective of the character of the accretions. The various decisions to which we have adverted rest on the view that the interest which the law has conferred upon the widow is a new kind of interest though in character it is what is commonly known as the Hindu widow’s estate. This interest is in substitution of her right under the pre-existing Hindu law to claim maintenance. The decisions also recognise , that though the widow does not, by virtue of the interest given to her by the new Jaw become a coparcener she being entitled to claim partition of the joint family property is in the same position in which her deceased husband would have been in the matter of exercise of that right. That is to say, according to these decisions her interest is a fluctuating one and is liable to increase or decrease according as there are deaths in or additions to the members of the family or according as there are accretions to or diminutions of the property. In our opinion these decisions lay down the law correctly. To hold, as contended for by Mr. Desai and as would appear from the two decisions upon which reliance was placed by him before us—Jadaobai v. Puranmal(*) and Siveshwar Prasad v. _Lala Har Narain(?)—would mean that whenever a coparcener in a Hindu: joint family dies leaving a widow a disruption takes place in the family. For, unless a disruption is deemed to take place, it would not be possible for the widow’s share to be ‘crystallised. The argument of Mr. Desai, however, is that the words in the Act “his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-s. (3) have in the property the same interest as he himself had” can only mean the interest which the deceased coparcener had at the moment of his death and the words “shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman’s estate” show that the nature of her interest was to be the same 4s already recognised by the: Hindu law. The legislature did not, he says, intend to create a new kind of interest nor to make her a coparcener. Undoubtedly she does not become a coparcener, though her interest in the family property is to be the same as that of her deceased husband _except that in extent it is to be that of a Hindu widow. (Now, of course, it has been enlarged by s. 14 \of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956). But a coparcener has no defined interest in the joint family property and the right which he has is to claim for partition. The quantum of his interest would be determinable
(1) LR, [1944] Nag. 832. (2) LL.R. (1944) 23 Pat. 760.
34 SUPREME COURT REPOR7S {1965} 1 S-C.R.
with teference to the date on which such member unequivocally declares his intention to separate and thus put an end to the coparcenary. [t cannot even be suggested that the event of the death of a coparcener is not tantamount to an unequivocal declaration by him to separate from the family. According to the theory underlying the Hindu law the widow of a deceased Hindu is his surviving half and, therefore, as long as she is alive he must be deemed to continue to exist in her person. This surviving half had under the Hindu law texts no right to claim a partition of the property of the family to which her husband belonged. But the Act of 1937 has conferred that right upon her. When the Act says that she will have the same right as her husband had it clearly means that she would be entitled to be allotted the . same share as her husband would have been entitled to had he lived on the date on which sne claimed partition.
Jadaobai’s case(*) in which a different view has been taken and on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Desai may now be considercd. In that case it was contended that the widow does not take any property by succession and, therefore, she is not liable to produce a succession certificate for the execution of a decree obiained by her husband. In support of this contention reliance was placed on behalf of the widow upon the decision in Natarajan Chettiar v. Perumal Ammal(*). In that case Horwill J. observed as follows :
“The widow does not obtain the right given under this section (section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937) by survivorship. She was not a coparcener before her husband’s death and she was not one afterwards. I do not however think that it follows that because the widow does not obtain her right by survivorship that she must obtain it by inheritance. The effect of s. 3 cls. (2) and (3) mav be regarded as a survival of the husband’s persona in the wife giving her the same rights as her husband -had except that she can alienate property only under certain circumstances. As the widow did not inherit her right, no succession certificate is necessary.”
The learned Judgcs of the Nagpur High Court observed that a person can take the prore:ty of another either by survivorship or by succession and that if. as held in the Madras case, the widow of « deceased coparcener does not take it by survivorship the only
“Q) LCR. (1944} Nar. 832. (2) ALR, 1943 Mad. 246.
LAKSHMI v. KRISHNAVENAMMA (Mudholkar J.) 35-
A way in which she could take it would be by succession. In the course of the judgment the learned Judges observed :
“Horwill J., in the Madras case quoted above, is of the opinion that the mere fact that the widow does not obtain her right by survivorship does nat lead to the conclusion B that she obtains it by inheritance. If she does not claim it by inheritance we fail to understand how she is claiming it in the face of the clear wording of the Act. The observations that the effect of section 3, clauses (2) and (3), may be regarded as a survival of the husband’s persona in the wife, giving her the same rights as her husband ‘had except .C that she can alienate property only under certain circumstances, do not indicate very clearly what was really intended to be laid down. Survivorship having been ruled out the only other mode by which she will be clothed with ‘the rights of her husband in the property, though to a limited extent, would be by succéssion or inheritance if she claims. D under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act.”
It seems to us that the learned Judges were not quite correct in saying that the property of one person can, on his death, devolve on another only by survivorship or by inheritance and in no other way. For, it is competent for the legislature to confer a right on
E a person to get the property of another on the latter’s death in certain circumstances. This. is precisely what has been done by tne legislature in enacting s. 3, sub-s. (2) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act. Adverting to the aforesaid decision it was observed by another division bench of the same High Court in Gurdayal v. Sarju(*):
“Reliance was, however, placed for the defendants on
Jadaobai v. Puranmal(?) where a Division Bench of this
Court held that the interest of the husband devolves on the widow by inheritance and not by survivorship. We have no quarrel with that. It does not matter for the purposes
G of this case how the interest which the Hindu Women’s ' Rights to Property Act gives Sarjubai devolved on her.
The question is of what does that interest consist. Even.
if it devolves on her by inheritance the interest is, accord- ing to the Act, ‘the same interest as the husband had’, and
“the same right of claiming a partition as a male owner.’
H Whether this right devolved on Sarjubai by. way of inheritance, or by succession, or whether because of the Act, as
~() ALR. [1952] Nag. 43. (2) LLLR. 1944] Nag. 832.
36 _ SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1965] 1 S.C.R.
a Statutory right, would make po difference. The right is the same as that of a male-owner and the interest is the game as her husband had. For these litnited purposes she merely steps into his shoes and can be regarded as a contmuation of himself.” In the next case relied upon, Siveshwar Prasad vy. Lala Har Narain(') a Division Bench has held that the interest which is acquired by a widow under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 is not as a survivor but as an heir of her husband. The interest, therefore, is an asset of her husband in her hands and can be proceeded against by a creditor even though it may be an undivided interest in a joint family property. It is difficult to appreciate how this decision is of assistance to the appellant. No doubt, the husband’s interest does not devolve on the widow by survivorship but it does not follow from that that the husband's interest gets crystallised at the moment of his death and that it is to this interest that the widow succeeds. On the other hand the view of the learned Judges that the husband’s interest is liable to be attached at the instance of the husband's creditors despite its devolution on the widow seems to accord with the view that the widow takes the husband’s interest as the surviving half of the husband, A passing reference was:also made by learned counsel to Rajendrabati v. Mungalal(?). The question for consideration in that case was the same as in Jadaobai’s case(*) and the High Court relying upon its earlier decision held that the provisions of s. 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 were attracted, the suit being one for the recovery of her share of the money due to the joint family of which her deceased husband was a member. In the course of the argument reliance was placed on a decision of the Madras High Cou:t in which it was held that under s. 3 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act a widow of a deceased copareener in a joint Hindu family becomes entitled to a right not as an heir but by statute and that she stands in the shoes of her deceased husband and continues to be a member of the joint family. This argument was rejected by the learned Judges who observed : “With the greatest respect I cannot accept this pro- ‘ position specially in view of the principles which have been so definitely Jaid down in two Bench decisions of this Court referred to above. The lady may be regarded as a member of the joint family but as has been pointed out by this Court the interest which devolves upon her after the death of the last male holder, must be regarded as an
(*) Ft R. (1944) 23 Pat. 760. (2) LL.R. (1952) 31 Pat. 477. (3) LLLR. [1944] Nag. 832.
LAKSHMI v. KRISHNAVENAMMA (Mudholkar J.) 37 interest descending to her as an heir, and as soon as it’ is, .
held that she acquires her interest as an heir section 214.
of the Succession Act would come into play and no decreé can be passed in her favour unless she produces a success ' sion certificate.”
As we have already pointed out the interest devolving upon the widow need not necessarily be either by survivorship or by inheritance but could also be in a third way i.e., by statute and where the interest is taken by her under a statute no further difficulty arises.
We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the High Court was right in allotting to the respondent half share in the family property at its partition. Accordingly we affirm its decree and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.